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PATENTS, PROPERTY AND COMPETITION POLICY 
 
Herbert Hovenkamp*
 Should competition policy have a more prominent role than it currently has 
in helping the patent system promote innovation?  In many other regulated 
industries the antitrust laws have a role, although often attenuated, in promoting 
competition.  As regulation is less “complete” there is generally more room for 





1  While the two most recent Supreme Court decisions on the issue 
refused to apply the antitrust laws to agency regulated practices, both did so 
because the Court believed that the regulatory agencies in question were taking 
an active and effective role in monitoring competitive problems.2
 In many ways the patent system resembles partial regulation.  First, the 
patent application process involves a petition to a government agency followed 
by a largely ex parte procedure in which the agency and the applicant negotiate 
the issuance of a patent.  Unlike many other regulatory regimes, there is no 




                                                 
*Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, Univ. of Iowa. 
 
1 See 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶241 (3d ed. 
2006). 
 
2 Verizon Communications  Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 
413 (2004) (agency was “an effective steward of the antitrust function”); Credit Suisse 
Securities (USA) LLC v. Billings, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (regulation less necessary where 
agency is actively enforcing practices with competition goals in mind; in this particular 
case “any enforcement-related need for an antitrust lawsuit is unusually small”). 
 
3 Proposed regulatory changes or rule making in the PTO requires a period of public 
comment, but not individual decisions whether to approve or delay a patent application.  
See Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F.Supp.2d 652 (E.D.Va. 2007) (rules promulgated by PTO 
outside the notice and comment rulemaking process violate the APA), rev’d on this 
issue, Tafas v. Doll, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 723353 (Fed. Cir. March 20, 2009).  See 
also Mark Leley, Doug Lichtman and Bhaven Sampat, What to Do about Bad Patents?, 
2005 Regulation 10 (2005-2006) (proposing post-grant review system initiated by 
competitors).   Accord MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
HARVESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 205-230 
(2009). 
  In any event, 
once a patent issues the process of agency regulation largely comes to an end 
for that particular patent.  Nearly all subsequent government supervision comes 
from the courts through privately initiated lawsuits.  To be sure, judicial inquiries 
during this period may relate back to the regulatory process – for example, a 
Walker Process antitrust claim may require reconsideration of the circumstances 
under which a patent was obtained, but this task generally befalls the court or 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338899




perhaps the Federal Trade Commission or International Trade Commission, 
rather than the PTO itself.4
 The decision to regulate generally involves the identification of markets 
where simple assignment of property rights is not sufficient to produce 





Historically the antitrust laws treated patents as a species of monopoly.  
Judges spoke of the “monopoly patent grant,” and were strongly suspicious of 
exclusive or collusive practices that they viewed as unauthorized attempts to 
expand patent rights.  They described these practices in terms such as 
“leveraging the patent monopoly,” or as an “unwarranted extension” of the 
patentee’s “monopoly.”
  By contrast, if property rights are well defined at the time they are 
initially created and can subsequently be traded to some reasonably competitive 
equilibrium, then regulation is thought not to be necessary.  In such cases the 
antitrust laws have a significant role to play in ensuring that the market can be as 
competitive as free trading allows. 
 
One problem with the patent system is that it has neither significant 
ongoing regulation nor a clear and effective initial assignment of property rights 
that serves to make the market perform competitively. One could attempt to 
correct this system either by defining the initial assignment of property rights 
more clearly or else by imposing more elaborate regulation that continued 
through the period subsequent to patent issuance and perhaps even for the 
remainder of a patent’s enforcement life.  Most of the proposals for reform would 
prefer the former course of action. 
 
6
                                                 
4 Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 US 172 
(1965).  See discussion, infra, text at notes ___.  Walker Process involved a claim that 
the patentee attempted to monopolize a market by filing baseless infringement actions 
on fraudulently obtained patents, or where it knew there was no infringement.  Such 
claims typically involve investigations into the circumstances under which a patent was 
obtained, including the truthfulness of statements made in the application. 
 
5 See 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶240-241 (3d 
ed. 2007); ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
INSTITUTIONS (PREFACE, i-xxxiv, ch. 1-19 (reprint ed., 1988). 
 
  Since monopoly implies the need for regulation and no 
6 E.g., see Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 US 29, 33 (1964) (“to use that leverage to 
project those royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to 
enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tying the sale or use of the patented article to the 
purchase or use of unpatented ones”); U.S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52,60-61 
(1973) (condemning the use of a patent for “economic leverage with which to insist upon 
and enforce the bulk-sales restrictions imposed on the licensees); Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (condemning the use of patent pools that 
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agency was at hand, the courts took up the task under a variety of rubrics, 
including the first sale doctrine,7 “misuse” doctrine,8 and antitrust policy.  The 
relation of patents to presumed monopoly led to such antitrust doctrines as the 
presumption that a patent confers market power for the purposes of the antitrust 
law of tying arrangements,9 or that tying of ordinary commodities such as salt to 
a patented durable good is somehow monopolistic,10 or the notion that 
agreements that extend royalty-like payments beyond the patent’s expiration 
improperly enlarge the patent monopoly.11  While doctrines such as the market 
power presumption might be thought of as fairly narrow, because it extended 
only to tying arrangements, it was in fact quite broad because so many post-
issuance patent practices can be characterized as “tying” of the patent, not 
merely to commodities, but also to other IP rights.12
                                                                                                                                                 
only allow bulk license agreements in an attempt to exclude competitors from the 
market); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942) (condemning 
“use of…patent monopoly to restrain competition in the marketing of unpatented articles, 
salt tablets, for use with the patented machines…aiding in the creation of a limited 
monopoly in the tablets not within that granted by the patent”).  Cf. Consolidated Electric 
Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 476 (1895) (overly broad claim on 
lightbulb filament amounted to “unwarranted extension of his [the patentee’s] 
monopoly”). 
 
7See Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp, The Evolution of IP/Competition 
Policy: the First Sale Rule and Vertical Restraints (2009, unpublished manuscript on file 
with authors). 
 
8 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, AND MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: 
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, CH. 3 
(2009); 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1781 (2D ED. 
2004); THOMAS F. COTTER, MISUSE, 44 HOUS.L.REV. 1 (2007); CHRISTINA BOHANNAN, 
MISUSE AND FORECLOSURE (2009, UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT ON FILE WITH AUTHOR). 
 
9 E.g., International Salt Co. v. US, 332 US 392 (1947); overruled by Illinois Tool 
Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 US 28 (2006). 
 
10 International Salt, id.. 
 
11 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 US 29, 33 (1964) (contract that required royalty 
payments past patent expiration date per se unlawful patent misuse). See also Zila, Inc. 
v. Tinnell, 501 F. 3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2007) (Brulotte applies to “a projection of patent 
monopoly after the patent expires”); Scheiber v. Dolby Laboratories, Inc., 293 F. 3d 1014 
(7th Cir. 2002) (reluctantly applying Brulotte). 
 
  For example, until the 
12 Indeed, even the Brulotte decision condemning post-expiration royalties used a 
tying analogy, proclaiming that the practice tied the royalties available during the patent 
period to the contractually created post-expiration royalties.  See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 
379 US 29, 33 (1964) (“to use that leverage to project those royalty payments beyond 




presumption was overruled in the Illinois Tool Works decision in 200613 it was 
applied to block booking of motion pictures14 as well as package licensing.15
In roughly the last quarter century, however, antitrust has done an about 
face.  It now regards patents as a form of property, which means that they confer 
the power to exclude, as all property does, but they only rarely create significant 




This shift in conception has had a dramatic influence on the application of 
antitrust to patent practices.  Perhaps most symbolic, it finally led in 2006 to the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of the sixty-year-old antitrust presumption that a 
patent conferred market power on its owner when the patentee was guilty of tying 
or related offenses – most typically, of requiring licensees of a patented good to 
take one or more unpatented consumable goods as well.
  One aspect of this paradigm shift in 
rhetoric from monopoly to property is that there is considerably less room for 
antitrust challenges to patent practices today than there was thirty and more 
years ago.  While competition policy is thought to have a great deal to say about 
monopoly, it is seldom concerned with problems pertaining to property rights as 
such, and almost never to simple claims about the scope of property rights.  This 
is doubly true in the case of patents because they are a creature of federal law.  
Antitrust generally has no business interfering in the legal regime created by 
another body of federal rules, even if those engaged in formulating competition 
policy believe that regime is deficient. 
 
17
                                                                                                                                                 
the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by 
tieing the sale or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones”).  
See also United States v. Microsoft, 253 F. 3d 34, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that 
“Microsoft’s exclusion of IE from the Add/Remove Programs utility and its commingling 
of browser and operating system code constitute exclusionary conduct, in violation of 
§2”). 
 
13 Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 US 28 (2006). 
 
14 United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); MCA Television Ltd. v. Public Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 
1265 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 
15 See McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381, 408 (10th Cir. 1965) 
(dicta); American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 154 F.Supp. 890 (D.C.Del. 
1957) (package licensing of patents constitutes misuse). 
 
16 Market power is the power to earn a profit by reducing output and letting the price 
rise to a level above cost.  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE 
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §§3.1-3.2 (3d ed. 2005). 
 
  But the shrinking 
17 International Salt Co. v. US, 332 US 392 (1947) (patentee required users of 
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domain of antitrust in the area of patents went much broader.  In the 1970’s the 
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department had promulgated a list of “nine no-
no’s,” or patent practices that it would presume to be automatic antitrust 
violations.18
But our revised conception of patents as property rather than monopoly 
remains incomplete in significant ways.  While “property” is rhetorically much less 
threatening than “monopoly,” that is so because traditional property rights come 
with built in limitations that serve to discipline the power to exclude -- namely, 
  The list included practices such as tying of unpatented goods to a 
patented tying product, grantbacks, exclusive dealing, package licensing, and 
resale price maintenance.  Today, virtually none of the nine no no’s remains a 
clear antitrust violation, and many would appear to be legal per se. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
patented salt injection machine to purchase its salt tablets for use in the machine); 
overruled by Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 US 28 (2006) (seller 
of patented printhead required users to purchase its unpatented ink). 
 
18 The "Nine No-Nos" were:  
(1) tying the purchase of unpatented materials as a condition of the 
license,  
(2) requiring the licensee to assign back subsequent patents, 
(3) restricting the right of the purchaser of the product in the resale of the 
product, 
(4) restricting the licensee's ability to deal in products outside the scope 
of the patent, 
(5) a licensor's agreement not to grant further licenses, 
(6)  mandatory package licenses, 
(7) royalty provisions not reasonably related to the licensee's sales, 
(8) restrictions on a licensee's use of a product made by a patented 
process, and, 
(9) minimum resale price provisions for the licensed products.  
 
Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks before the Fourth New 
England Antitrust Conference, Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use, 
Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions (Nov. 6, 1970).  See Richard Gilbert and Carl 
Shapiro, Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of Intellectual Property: The Nine No-No's Meet 
the Nineties, available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/ninenono.pdf.  See 
also, Herbert Hovenkamp, The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface, COMPETITION 
LAW AND POLICY 1979 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287628.  Practice number 3 – 
post-sale restraints – might still be unenforceable under the first sale doctrine.  See 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). But such 
restraints are not generally antitrust violations.  See Christina Bohannan and Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Evolution of IP/Competition Policy: the First Sale Rule and Vertical 
Restraints (2009, unpublished manuscript on file with authors); Christina Bohannan, 
Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 Maryland L.Rev. 611 (2008). 
 




boundaries and priority rules that define the extent of ownership and give notice 
to non-owners.  Patent law has become “property” without either.  Indeed, many 
of the opportunities for anticompetitive behavior in the area of patents can be 
traced back to the twin problems that boundaries are not clear and priority, and 
thus ownership, is so difficult to determine. 
 
 In their important book on Patent Failure, James Bessen and Michael 
Meurer also treat patents as property.  But they rightfully insist on more follow 
through than the law has exhibited in the past.19  If it deserves to be treated as 
property, they believe, then it should be governed by a set of administrable, 
relatively clear rules such as those that govern other property rights.20
 The problem that Bessen and Meurer raise is troubling for competition 
policy.  Antitrust has gone from one unsatisfactory regime to another.  In the first, 
it uncritically accepted the notion that patents are a species of monopoly without 
any of the usual inquiries into the relation between the patent and the power to 
charge monopoly prices or to exclude from a property defined market.  In the 
second it has adopted a notion of patents as property without any of the 
discipline accorded by rules governing boundaries and priorities that are almost 
universal characteristics of property systems.  Without clear limitations the ironic 
result is that patents often do behave more like monopoly than like property.  
This is clearly the case, for example, in some of the reverse payment settlement 
agreements that courts have upheld notwithstanding clear collusion,
 
 
21 and also 
some instances of patent holdup that arise in the standard setting context.22
 Treating patents as property for purposes of competition policy is not 
merely a good idea.  It is essential to understanding the role of patents in a 
competitive economy based on private enterprise.  Patents are productive and 
transferable assets.  Just as property rights generally, patents give their owner 
something very close to exclusive control over the bundle of attributes covered 
 
 
Competition Policy and Patent Property: 
Boundaries and Priorities 
 
                                                 
19 JAMES BESSEN AND MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INOVATORS AT RISK (2008).  See also F. Russell 
Denton, Plumb Lines instead of a Wrecking Ball: A Model for Recalibrating Patent 
Scope, 16 J.INTEL.PROP.L. 1 (Fall 2008). 
 
20 Id. at 46-94. 
 
21 See discussion infra, text at notes ___. 
 
22 See discussion infra, text at notes ___. 
 
 Patents, Property, Competition 7 
 
by the right.  And like most property rights, while they entail a power to exclude 
they rarely confer economic market power in and of themselves.23  In order to 
function as property they have to be made exchangeable and divisible.  At the 
same time, while property rights themselves are hardly anticompetitive and are 
essential to the creation of any economy, they can be used anticompetitively.  
For example, they can be the subject of price-fixing, unlawful mergers, or in 
some cases exclusionary practices.  To the extent they involve substantial and 
irreversible commitments they can also create entry barriers or lock people in to 
pre-existing commitments.24  But except for a few details these rules are the 
same for all property rights, including rights in intellectual property.25
 Insofar as competition policy is concerned, some of the biggest 
shortcomings of the patent system relate to its status as a system of property 
rights.  The problems relate to two very general subjects that are well known to 
property lawyers: boundaries and priority.  Both are essential to an enforceable, 
useful system of rights.  Indeed, the development of the common law was heavily 
preoccupied with the establishment of clear boundaries and priorities, and the 
result was an elaborate system of rules that generally gives the property owner a 




 Inadequate doctrine of patent boundaries explains the difficulties that 
antitrust has in addressing two types of antitrust issues.  One is the variations on 
the Walker Process doctrine, which concerns the bringing of improper patent 
infringement suits.  The other concerns the high degree of judicial deference that 
is accorded to patent settlements, even if obviously anticompetitive.  Inadequate 
  Having done a title search, which provides 
information about priorities and legal boundaries, and a survey to establish 
physical boundaries, a developer can put up a building with a high degree of 
confidence that he is not infringing on someone else’s land.  By contrast, much of 
patent/antitrust doctrine arises from the fact that these ordinary and essential 
property limitations are so poorly defined within the patent system. 
 
                                                 
23 See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶518 (3d ed. 
2007). 
 
24 See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 
___ J.Corp.L. ___ (2009) (forthcoming) 
 
25 One exception is the often-criticized General Electric rule, making horizontal price 
fixing in patent licensing agreements lawful.  United States v. General Electric Co., 272 
US 476 (1926). 
 
26 See, e.g., MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF 
REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 2002); RICHARD POWELL, REAL PROPERTY (6 vols., 1949-1958, 
plus current supps). 
 




doctrine in the area of priorities accounts for much of the antitrust problem of 
patent holdup, or the assertion after the fact of patent rights that put developers 
to the choice of paying exorbitant royalties or else abandoning technology to 
which they have already made a significant investment. 
 
Walker Process and the Boundary Problem 
 
 In Walker Process the Supreme Court held that someone who obtained a 
patent by “fraud” and subsequently filed an infringement suit could violate the 
antitrust laws if the lawsuit tended to strengthen or prolong the firm’s dominant 
position in some market, or to create market power.27  Today most Walker 
Process claims arise as counterclaims to patent infringement suits.28  As a result, 
the Federal Circuit hears most of the appeals,29 and the Supreme Court has not 
returned to the issue except for a 1993 decision involving an allegedly improper 
copyright infringement suit.30  The Federal Circuit has made Walker Process 
claims very difficult to sustain, perhaps because they are asserted so frequently.  
Most recently, in its Dippin’ Dots decision, the Federal Circuit held that a 
patentee who had himself made some 500 sales of a patented product in 
violation of the on sale bar,31
                                                 
27 Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 
(1965).; see 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶706 (3d ed. 
2008); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, AND MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: 
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §11.2 
(2009).  In addition to exclusionary conduct, the antitrust plaintiff, or infringement suit 
counterclaimant, must also show market power and make out any other elements of an 
antitrust violation.See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶208 (3d ed. 2006). 
 
283 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, note __, ¶706. 
 
29 This Federal Circuit monopoly on patent cases is thought by many to be part of the 
patent problem – that is, there is no competition among the circuits to purge out errors.  
See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principles, 
101 NW.UNIV.L.REV. 1619 (2007); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Commentary on Bessen and 
Meurer’s Patent Failure: an Industry Perspective, 16 J.INTELL.PROP.L. 57 (2008).  See 
also Cecil D. Quillen, Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA.L.&BUS.REV. 207, 
210-225 (2006) (on effects of consolidation of appeals into the Federal Circuit). 
 
30 See Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 
49 (1993) ("PRE"); see 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
&205b (3d ed. 2006); 3 id. ¶706. 
 
31 35 U.S.C. §102b. 
 
 and whose patent was therefore invalid, did not 
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violate the antitrust laws by maintaining an infringement action.32  The court 
concluded that the patentee had submitted his application without any 
explanation of a “knowing failure to disclose sales that bear all the earmarks of 
commercialization,” and that this supported an inference of intent to mislead the 
PTO.33
 However, this evidence of fraud was insufficient in the eyes of the Federal 
Circuit to warrant antitrust condemnation, which required a stronger showing of 
both intent and materiality.
  
 
34  On these facts, this translated into a requirement of 
“evidence of intent separable from the simple fact of the omission.”35
It might be argued that because the omitted reference was so 
important to patentability, DDI [the patentee] must have known of its 
importance and must have made a conscious decision not to disclose it. 
That argument has some force, but to take it too far would be to allow the 
high materiality of the omission to be balanced against a lesser showing of 
deceptive intent by the patentee. Weighing intent and materiality together 
is appropriate when assessing whether the patentee's prosecution 
conduct was inequitable. However, when Walker Process claimants wield 
that conduct as a "sword" to obtain antitrust damages rather than as a 
mere "shield" against enforcement of the patent, they must prove 
deceptive intent independently.




                                                 
32 Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
128 S.Ct. 375 (2007). 
 
33Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346.  The court also noted that “The concealment of 
sales information can be particularly egregious because, unlike the applicant's failure to 
disclose, for example, a material patent reference, the examiner has no way of securing 
the information on his own.”  The same thing could be said of the alleged infringer. 
 
34 “Materiality” refers to the likelihood that the patent would have been rejected had 
the true facts been known.  See 3 ANTITRUST LAW, note __, at ¶705. 
 
35Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1347.  Walker Process itself spoke of the fraud as all that 
was required, saying nothing of evidence of intent separate from the false sworn 
statement itself. 
 
36Id., 476 F.3d at 1348 (internal citations omitted).  The court added: 
 
 
While Walker Process intent may be inferred from the facts and 
circumstances of a case, "[a] mere failure to cite a reference to the PTO will not 
suffice."  This is not to say that an omission always reduces to "mere failure to 
cite." We acknowledged in Nobelpharma "that omissions, as well as 
misrepresentations, may in limited circumstances support a finding of Walker 





 In this case the sales that violated the on sale bar had occurred in 1987, 
and the eventual patent infringement suit was filed in 2000, thirteen years later.37  
Further, the improper conduct was not limited to the misrepresentation to the 
PTO about prior sales; it also consisted in the subsequent filing of a patent 
infringement lawsuit, presumably designed to exclude the infringement defendant 
in the hopes that the disqualifying sales would not be discovered.  Certainly one 
who files a patent infringement suit with present knowledge that the patent is 
unenforceable has met '2's conduct requirement, particularly in an area where 
the information that would be necessary to defeat patentability was not in the 
hands of the PTO itself or, presumably, the public.  The decision seems to be at 
odds with Walker Process itself, which also involved a patent obtained upon a 
false affidavit about the lack of prior sales.38
 It is one thing to file a patent infringement suit on a patent that is 
reasonably subject to dispute on the basis of public information – for example, 
where there is a legal dispute about subject matter
 
 
 Further, while the Federal Circuit required something more than a 
sufficient misrepresentation to warrant a conclusion of inequitable conduct, it 
overlooked the fact that it had something more.  Not only had the patentee 
misrepresented its sales history to the PTO during the application process, but it 
also filed an infringement action a decade later after the sales evidence was 
stale. 
 
39 or claim construction.40
                                                                                                                                                 
Process fraud ... because a fraudulent omission can be just as reprehensible as 
a fraudulent misrepresentation." We believe, though, that to find a prosecution 
omission fraudulent there must be evidence of intent separable from the simple 
fact of the omission. 
(citing and quoting Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1070-
1071, cert. denied 525 US 876 (1998)).   
37 See In re Dippin' Dots Patent Litigation, 249 F.Supp.2d 1346 (N.D.Ga.,2003) 
(docket entry). 
 
38See Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174 (“Food Machinery had sworn before the 
Patent Office that it neither knew nor believed that its invention had been in public use in 
the United States for more than one year prior to filing its patent application when, in 
fact, Food Machinery was a party to prior use within such time.”). 
 
39 E.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 
40 E.g., Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2009 
WL ____ (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2009). 
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Both the patentee and the infringer has the same access to relevant information 
– so this amounts to a “title dispute” over the meaning of the public record.41
 The United States courts strongly favor settlement of patent infringement 
suits and rarely second guess them, even if they involve practices that are prima 
facie anticompetitive, such as price fixing or, more frequently, market division.
  But 
fraudulent failure to disclose prior sales is something that one cannot reasonably 
expect to show up in the record, and sales made by the patentee itself thirteen 
years earlier might very well not ever show up at all.  In that case the patentee 
was attempting to exclude others from a line of commerce that rightfully belonged 
to the public.  Perhaps we are less concerned in a case such as Dippin’ Dots 
because we doubt that a relevant economic market exists for a particular ice 
cream product, but that is a completely different issue.  The patent in question 
could just as easily have covered a market shifting innovation and created a real 
economic monopoly for something that should have been offered to the public 
under competition. 
 
Uncertain Boundaries and Patent Lawsuit Settlements 
 
42  
Further, as a general matter a court entertaining an antitrust challenge to a 
settlement agreement will refuse to inquire into the merits of the underlying IP 
infringement dispute.43
 This view has been carried to its extreme in several recent cases involving 
so-called “reverse payment” settlements in the pharmaceutical industry, in which 
the market dominating maker of a pioneer drug pays a generic producer large 
sums of money in exchange for the generic’s commitment to stay out of the 
  That is, the court will not generally ask such questions as 
whether the patent was valid and enforceable, or whether the infringement 
defendant’s technology or product actually infringed the patent.  The basic logic 
of this approach is clear enough: given the ambiguity of outcome that occurs in 
so many infringement suits, the whole purpose of the settlement is to avoid 
determining questions of validity, scope, and infringement, difficult areas where 
reasonable minds can differ about the income.  For an antitrust challenger to ask 
a court to look into the merits would undermine the purpose of settlement 
altogether, which is to provide closure of the issue and avoid a judicial 
determination that is highly likely to be unsatisfactory. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
41 Cf. See Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 
U.S. 49 (1993) ("PRE"), where the dispute was over a question of law, namely, whether 
showing a videotape of a commercial movie in an hotel room constituted a public 
“performance.” 
 
42 See 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶2046 (2d ed. 2005). 
 
43 Ibid. 




market for a specified period.44  In the cases approving such settlements the 
courts generally refuse to inquire into the merits of the patent infringement 
dispute.45
Several patent holdup cases involve abuses of the patent continuation 
process.  Many patent applications are rejected upon initial submission, but they 
are rarely rejected with absolute finality.  Further, subsequent to filing its original 
application a patent applicant might wish to write an application with broader or 
somewhat different claims, or perhaps add claims that were not made in the 
original application.  Or it may wish to rewrite claims that had been rejected in the 
original application.  A patent "continuation" is an application for revised or 
additional claims made on a patent that was previously applied for.
 
 
 We cannot say that the antitrust decisions refusing to investigate the 
merits of the infringement suit are incorrect.  But the point is that the 
indeterminacy in the patent system creates the intolerable situation that the 
courts have to defer to agreements that would constitute per se antitrust 
violations and even criminal offenses outside the patent context, simply because 
the question of infringement is so difficult to determine.  In the eyes of these 
courts, the prospect of having to determine the proper boundary lines of a patent 
are so daunting that they are sufficient to justify a naked cartel that the parties 
have a very strong incentive to negotiate.  That is, if the patent is invalid the 
generic can enter the market in competition with the patentee and soon after with 
others, producing something close to the competitive return.  The settlement 
entitles the two firms to share the market’s monopoly profits.  Thus the settlement 
injures consumers while giving the parties any cartel benefits that might accrue 
from sharing the returns of a monopolized product. 
 
Priorities, Standard Setting and Holdup 
 
46
                                                 
 
44 See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323, (Fed.Cir. 
2008); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F. 3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); Schering-
Plough Corporation v. FTC, 402 F. 3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).  See also C. Scott Hemphill, 
Paying for Delay:  Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (Nov. 2006); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis and Mark A. 
Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlements of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 
1719 (2003). 
45E.g., Ciprofloxacin, supra, 544 F. 3d at 1333 (“there is a long standing policy in the 
law in favor of settlements, and this policy extends to patent infringement litigation”). 
 
46 The Patent Act provides for continuations in 35 U.S.C. '132.  On possible abuses, 
see Mark A. Lemley and Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 
BOSTON UNIV. L.REV. 63 (2004).  See also James W. Beard, Weeds in the docket: Tafas 
v. Dudas, Patent Continuation Reforms, and their Impact on patent Applications in the 
Biotechnology Industry, 9 J.PATENT & TRADEMARK OFC. SOC’Y 423 (2008); Harold C. 
 Patents, Property, Competition 13 
 
 
A "divisional" application is a particular type of patent continuation in which 
the original patent application lacked "unity."47  "Unity of invention" is said to be a 
prerequisite for patenting because a patent may relate to only one invention, or 
perhaps to a group of closely related inventions.  When a patent is rejected for 
lack of unity the patentee may then file a "divisional" application for spin-off of 
second, third, or subsequent inventions.48
Under generally accepted patent practices in the United States, when a 
subsequent continuation or divisional application is granted the subsequent 
patent "relates back" to the date of the original patent application, and will 
typically retain the original application's priority over rival filings.  This relation 
back creates the priority problem that can lead to patent abuse and has been the 
subject of some reform efforts within the PTO itself.
  The PTO may reject a patent 
altogether for lack of unity, or it may grant a patent on one invention while leaving 
the patentee free to file later divisional applications for other inventions that were 
arguably covered in the original application. 
 
49
                                                                                                                                                 
Wegner, Abolishing Continuation: A Four Part Program to Improve the Patent Process, 
GEORGE WASHINGTON U. LAW SCHOOL (April 2, 2008).  And see Samson Vermont, 
Taming the Doctrine of Equivalents in Light of “Patent Failure,” p. 3 n. 6 (George Mason 
Law and Economics Research Paper, available at 
  The continuation process 
makes it possible for a patentee to write updated claims designed to exclude a 
rival's invention that has been placed on the market subsequent to the date of the 
original application.  For example, a patent applicant might file a patent 
application in 2000.  In 2001 someone else might place a new invention on the 
market.  The 2000 applicant might then file a continuation or divisional 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1255743)   (“Applicants use 
continuations to sit and wait to see what competitors do.  Applicants then amend the 
pending claims accordingly.  The notice costs generated by continuations appear to be 
high enough to justify restricting if not eliminating them altogether.”). 
47 On divisional applications, see 35 U.S.C. §121. 
48 In such cases the original application is called the "parent."  Typically the patentee 
will claim one invention off the parent application, and then begin a process of filing 
additional "divisional" applications for other inventions covered by the patent.  When 
these later divisional applications are granted the priority date of those patents ordinarily 
relates back to the date of the parent.  Further, the claims language in the subsequent 
divisional applications need not be identical with that in the parent and can cover 
technology that was not actually contemplated in the parent. 
49 See Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 656 (E.D. Va. 2007) (PTOs efforts 
exceeded its rule making power), rev’d on other grounds, Tafas v. Doll, ___ F.3d ___, 
2009 WL 723353 (Fed. Cir. March 20, 2009).  The Federal Circuit approved the district 
court’s refusal to approve the PTO’s limitations on continuations, finding them to be 
inconsistent with the statutory mandate that the enforcement date of approved patents 
relates back to the application date. 
 




application  with new or revised claims expressly designed to cover the 2001 
invention and claim priority over it, even though the 2001 inventor had no 
reasonable way of knowing that its invention was subject to an "earlier" patent.  If 
a divisional patent is later granted in, say, 2002, its priority date will relate back to 
the 2000 patent.50  The harmfulness of this process is exacerbated by the fact 
that the publication requirements for pending patent applications in the United 
States are very weak, requiring publication only 18 months after filing, and even 
then only if the application is not subject to foreign filing as well.51
 The possibility of such abuses reveals one of the more deficient aspects of 
the patent system's failure to provide adequate notice to inventors.
  Even if the 
application is published a rival cannot know with certainty what its claims will be 
until final approval. 
 
52
                                                 
     50Lemley and Moore cite these cases as examples, with these parentheticals: 
 
 [In] Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (E.D. Cal. 2002), the 
plaintiff filed a patent application covering monoclonal antibodies in 1984, a time 
when the technology was in its infancy. It kept various applications pending in the 
PTO until 1999, when it drafted new claims designed to cover not just 
monoclonal antibodies as they were understood in 1984, but new types of 
antibodies developed in the intervening 15 years, including those invented by the 
defendant. Id. at 1151-52. Another example is Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline 
Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The patentee there amended his claims to 
a reclining chair to claim placing the controls for that chair in a position he never 
thought of, but saw for the first time on his competitor's product. Id. at 1479 
("Sproule admitted at trial that he did not consider placing the controls outside the 
console until he became aware that some of Gentry's competitors were so 
locating the recliner controls."). 
See Lemley and Moore, Ending Abuse, note __, 84 BOSTON UNIV.L.REV. at 76-77.  See 
also  Steve Blount, The Use of Delaying Tactics to Obtain Submarine Patents and 
Amend Around a Patent that A Competitor Has Designed Around, 81 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11 (1999). 
     51See 35 U.S.C. '122(b). 
     52See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW &704a,b (3d 
ed. 2008).  See JAMES BESSEN AND MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 62-65 (2008), noting, inter alia, 
that the number of continuing applications had increased seven-fold in the previous 
twenty years.  Further, 
 
 Applicants can change claim language in patents without updating the published 
applications.  The final claim language is published only after the patent is 
issued, and the gap between application date and issuance is growing.  
Moreover, publication does little to prevent patent applicants from introducing 
unanticipated new claims via continuing applications. 
 
  While 
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patents may be a species of property, they are property with a woefully 
inadequate system for recording titles and making them public prior to someone 
else's investment decision.  To the extent a patentee can manipulate the 
continuation or divisional process to write patent claims on the existing inventions 
of other inventors who did not have adequate prior notice of them, the policy 
reduces rather than increases the incentive to innovate.  An inventor might do a 
thorough patent search and not find any prior claim on his invention, but later be 
made the subject of an infringement suit on the basis of a continuing or divisional 
application that was filed later but that earns the priority of the original patent 
application. 
 
 Nevertheless, there is probably little room for application of the antitrust 
laws, given that the Federal Circuit has expressly approved the use of 
continuation and divisional applications to write updated claims on a competitor's 
existing products or technology. 53
 While we believe such an approach to the giving of notice deters rather 
than promotes innovation, the fact is that conduct approved by law cannot form 
  The notice and publication provisions are part 
of the law as well. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Id. at 63. 
     53See Kingsdown Medical Consultants v. Hollister, 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 
1988): 
 
 [T]here is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent 
application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known 
competitor's product from the market; nor is it in any manner improper to 
amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor's product the 
applicant's attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent 
application. Any such amendment or insertion must comply with all 
statutes and regulations, of course, but, if it does, its genesis in the 
marketplace is simply irrelevant and cannot of itself evidence deceitful 
intent.  To be sure, applicants do not simply have carte blanche to rewrite 
their claims. The new claims must find adequate support in the original 
application. If not, the patent will be invalid for lack of enablement or 
written description, or alternatively, the new claims will be considered 
"new matter" invented only as of the date the claims were added.  If the 
patentee can find some support in the original patent application for the 
current claims, however, she can obtain legal rights over ideas that (at 
least in that form) never occurred to her until she saw what others were 
already doing. 
 
Accord State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
See Lemley, note ___, 84 BOSTON UNIV. L.REV. at 77-78. 




the basis of an antitrust claim when the patentee later files an infringement action 
based on such an after-acquired right.  The antitrust laws, which are very 
generally, do not provide the courts with a mandate to fix broken regulatory 
regimes. 
 
Competition Policy under Clear Property Rights 
 
 While patents are property, the three types of disputes discussed above 
can have severe implications for competition.  Further, they rarely arise in 
property regimes where boundaries and priorities are better behaved.  Indeed, 
one of the ironies is that antitrust is effectively ousted from these disputes 
precisely because patent boundaries and priorities perform so poorly. 
 
 For example, Walker Process violations are very difficult to prove because 
it is so very difficult for a court to conclude that an infringement action was 
brought in bad faith, given the great difficulty in determining both the validity of 
patents and the fact of infringement.  To place the dispute in the context of real 
property.  Suppose that I file a trespass action against you without having clear 
title to my own property, or where it is highly unlikely that you are trespassing 
because the boundary is not where I say it is.  While such a lawsuit would not 
often provoke an antitrust counterclaim, it certainly could result in a claim of 
malicious prosecution, and a court would have little difficulty assessing the 
merits.54
 If a consumer group seeking lower grocery prices challenged this 
settlement as a market division agreement, no court would hesitate to consider 
evidence of a title search showing that I never owned the property in question.  
 
 
 Likewise, the real property analogue to settlements is something like this: 
suppose I own a grocery store and you acquire an adjacent parcel and begin 
building a competing store.  I then file a trespass claim against you, alleging that 
you are building on my property.  We settle our litigation by an agreement under 
which I pay you $1000 a month and you agree that during the pendency of the 
payments you will not operate a competing store on the disputed property. 
 
                                                 
54 See Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71 (2nd Cir. 2008) (town officials 
did not violate employee’s right to be free of malicious prosecution, even though 
employee was subsequently acquitted of trespass); Kee v. Ahlm, 219 Fed. Appx. 727 
(10th Cir. 2007) (police officer held not liable to bar patron for malicious prosecution 
where officer had probable cause to arrest for criminal trespass); Blankenhorn v. City of 
Orange, 485 F. 3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007) (police officers who were not involved in providing 
false statements to prosecutor were not liable in action alleging malicious prosecution); 
McElya v. Hill, 105 Tenn. 319, 59 S.W. 1025 (1900) (whether lawsuit on claimed defect 
in real property title caused by pre-existing mortgage  amounted to malicious 
prosecution presented jury question). 
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Further, if the court agreed that I did not own this property it would not hesitate to 
proclaim my trespass action a sham and the “settlement” a per se antitrust 
violation. 
 
 That is to say, courts often proclaim that they are loathe to inquire into the 
underlying merits of patent settlement agreements.55
 Finally, the holdup problem is analogous to that of the real estate 
developer with a piece of land for which he is unsure about the title. She would 
do a title search and, having found no conflict, proceed with confidence.  Without 
that knowledge an adverse holding down the road could mean that the developer 
either loses the development or else is thrust into a bilateral monopoly situation 
in which she must bargain with the true owner for a right to which he has already 
made a very significant commitment.  The result of this lack of clarity will be that 
the developer will likely follow an alternative course.
  But contrary to what many 
of them state, this reluctance is not explained by the general legal policy favoring 
settlements.  Rather, the driving force is the great difficulty attending the 
determination of patent validity or scope. 
 
56
                                                 
55 See e.g., Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 170 (1931) (courts 
should encourage settlement of "legitimately conflicting claims"); accord Boston Scientific 
Corp. v. Schneider (Eur.) AG, 983 F.Supp. 245 (D.Mass. 1997), app. dism'd, 152 F.3d 947 
(Fed.Cir. 1998) (reasonable settlement challenged by competitor as concerted refusal to 
deal).  Cf. Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 289 F.Supp.2d 986, 991-
992 (N.D.Ill. 2003) (Posner, J.): 
 Only if a patent settlement is a device for circumventing antitrust law is it vulnerable 
to an antitrust suit. Suppose a seller obtains a patent that it knows is almost 
certainly invalid (that is, almost certain not to survive a judicial challenge), sues its 
competitors, and settles the suit by licensing them to use its patent in exchange for 
their agreeing not to sell the patented product for less than the price specified in the 
license. In such a case, the patent, the suit, and the settlement would be 
devices--masks--for fixing prices, in violation of antitrust law.  
 
 
citing 2 Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, IP and Antitrust: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles 
Applied to Intellectual Property Lawt '31.1c (2002).  See also WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 382-385 
(2003).  Department of Justice and FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property '5.5 & Example 10 (1995), available at 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm.   ("settlements involving the cross-licensing 
of intellectual property rights can be an efficient means to avoid litigation and, in general, 
courts favor such settlements.").  See also 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶2046 (2d ed. 2005); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2001)(noting preference for settlement). 
56Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (2008) (in some 
markets innovators may simply eschew a search because the costs are high and 
reliability very low). 




 The social cost of such “second best” decisions is undoubtedly very high – 
and it is a social cost that Bessen and Meurer do not even include when they 
calculate the already devastating social costs of our existing patent system.  It 
creates what might be called the “reverse Plant” phenomenon.  In 1934 Arnold 
Plant opined that the patent system tends to divert research toward things that 
are capable of being patented rather than things that are not.57
 Our current system (1) gives very poor notice of patent ownership to 
outsiders
  The obverse 
phenomenon is that developers who are unsure of what patent rights are out 
there will tend to invest in areas where patent rights are clear or where patents 
held by others are absent; or they will simply invest less.  The greater the risk of 
unfavorable patent litigation, the less likely the investment will be made.  As the 
proliferation of patents with uncertain scope becomes larger, this phenomenon 
forces more and more development decisions off their optimal course. 
 
Who Benefits from Ambiguous or Overly Broad Patent 
Boundaries and Priorities? 
 
 Boundaries and priorities problems are not inherently signs of special 
interest capture.  They may simply be evidence of a technically deficient system, 
or perhaps they are problems that do not have satisfactory solutions, quite apart 
from special interest capture.  Nevertheless, it seems clear that lack of clarity in 
patent boundaries and priorities benefits patent owners far more than 




                                                 
57 Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 30 (1934). 
; (2) does not make knowledge of infringement or copying of another’s 
patent right a precondition for enforcement; and (3) upon enforcement, awards 
damages for past as well as future acts of infringement.  Such a scenario is a 
recipe for patentee aggrandizement at the expense of the public.  It imperils 
innovators, who do not know if they are building on property owned by someone 
else, just as much as lack of a clear land title imperils real estate development. 
 
58Copyright has its own analogy to the boundaries problem – namely the “fair use” 
doctrine, whose uncertain boundaries create a clear disincentive to creative work that 
makes limited or transformative use of the work of others.  The indeterminacy of fair use 
law and the high cost of fair use determinations in court have enabled copyright owners 
to scare much of the public away from asserting rights that constitute fair use but where 
individual members of the public lack the resources to litigate.  See Christina Bohannan, 
Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 Wash.Univ.L.Rev. 969 (2007); 
Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm and the First Amendment (Iowa Legal Studies 
Working Paper, March 24, 2009, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1367624). 
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 At the same time, however, the system permits patent owners to profit 
because it greatly increases the risk of a trespass, just as a land ownership 
system without effective an recording system would do.  But there is no social 
value in a system that creates poorly defined property rights just so that 
entrepreneurial people are more likely to commit a trespass and then will have to 
pay the consequences.  Further, the consequences are not limited to the simple 
cost of trespassing.  Because investment is so path dependent a late discovered 
infringement may lock the investor into a situation in which it has no choice but to 
stick with an investment it has already made, giving the patentee an effective 
monopoly right against a locked-in developer.59
One could address these failures in the patent system in numerous 
ways,
  Patent values are not efficient 
unless they can be determined ex ante, before a developer has made the 
relevant commitments and when it can assess the full range of alternatives. 
 
Conclusion: 
Patent Failure, Interest Groups, and Competition Policy 
 
60 including but not limited to: (1) providing for better notice through a 
variety of processes, including greater discipline on abstract language in patent 
claims, limitations on the continuation process,61 or a less expansive doctrine of 
equivalents;62 (2) require knowledge, or copying, as a precondition of 
infringement;63 or (3) limit infringement awards to prospective relief, at least 
against innocent infringers.  A combination of these things could be helpful as 
well.  Some of this might be accomplished by statutory construction,64
However, it is not obvious that antitrust will be particularly useful in forcing 
 although 
most would probably require amendment of the statutes. 
 
                                                 
59 The problem can be solved in some cases by estoppels rules, but only if there is a 
clear misrepresentation.  See Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (applying equitable estoppels against enforcement of patent where patentee 
participated in standard setting organization and made false representations about its 
patents).  See also Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(similar conduct may have constituted unlawful monopolization). 
60 For one proposal, see F. Russell Denton, Plumb Lines Instead of a Wrecking Ball; 
A Model for Recalibrating Patent Scope, 16 J. INTEL.PROP.L.1 ( 2008). 
61 See Bessen and Meurer, note __. 
62See Samson Vermont, Taming the Doctrine of Equivalents in Light of “Patent 
Failure,” 16 J.INTELL.PROP.L. 83 (2008). 
63 On this issue, see Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to 
Patent Infringement, 105 MICH.L.REV. 475 (2006); Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, AM. 
ECON. REV. 92, 95 (may 2006); Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require 
Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH.L.REV. 1525 (2007). 
64 On use of statutory construction to address capture problems arising under the 
Copyright Act, see Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 Cardozo Arts and 
Ent’mt L.J. 567 (2006). 




any of these reforms.  Indeed, one of the ironies of our situation is that the very 
imperfections that serve to make the patent system function so poorly and often 
anticompetitively also make antitrust a poor instrument for dealing with it.65  
Walker Process is the weak doctrine that it is precisely because patent 
boundaries are so ambiguous.  Given the strong constitutionally protected set of 
rights that we have to access our government, including its court system, Walker 
Process kicks in only when it is clear that no reasonable person acting in good 
faith would have made the patent claim that was made under the circumstances.  
But the more ambiguous the claim, the more reasonable people will differ about 
its scope.  As a result the very ambiguities that make the system so harmful for 
smaller firms also serve to undermine antitrust enforcement.  And this is a 
significant problem in light of the very substantial contribution that small firms 
make to innovation,66 as well as the fact that they are often the target of 
infringement suits that are improperly brought by firms that have far greater 
litigation resources than themselves.67
To the extent patent failure results from interest group capture it is 
because private interests do not align themselves with the public interest.  For 
the most part, patent owners (whether inventor or assignee) want patents that 
cover as much as possible, last as long as possible, and have the fewest 
possible limitations on the way they can be used or licensed.  Those concerned 
about the risk of committing infringement largely want the opposite.  The interest 




68 is consumers, who presumably benefit from optimal rates of 
innovation.  In that sense the goal of an efficient IP system is identical to the goal 
of an efficient antitrust system.69
                                                 
65 On this point, see Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: 
Errands into the Wilderness (unpublished manuscript on file with authors). 
  But in IP as in antitrust, consumers are rarely 
recognized at the legislative bargaining table. 
 
 First and foremost, patent reforms must come from new legislation, new 
judicial interpretation, or new regulatory initiatives in the PTO.  But we live in an 
imperfect world, and those reforms may be a long time in coming, and indeed 
they may not come at all.  Or we may discover that both political and practical 
impediments to internal reform are great. 
66 See Anthony Breitzman and Diana Hicks , An Analysis of Small Business Patents 
by Industry and Firm Size, (SBA Office of Advocacy, Nov. 2008) , available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs335tot.pdf (finding that small firms tend to innovate 
more on a per employee basis, and that the patents that small firms develop tend to be 
of a higher quality than those developed by large firms). 
67 See Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 INDIANA L.J. 133 (2008). 
68 United States Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
69 On the consumer welfare principle in antitrust, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE 
ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 13-20 (2006). 
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 To be sure, the history of antitrust in other regulated markets may provide 
some wisdom.  One important difference between the patent system and most of 
the regulatory regimes in which regulatory immunities apply is the duration of 
supervision.  In industries such as securities and telecommunications, the subject 
of two relatively recent antitrust/regulation decisions,70
This suggests a more important role for antitrust during the “post-grant” 
period, although a very limited role respecting things that happen during the 
patent application process itself, where the PTO is the effective decision maker 
and exercises considerable control over the patent application process.  In fact, 
the system that we have has evolved largely along these lines.  But the lingering 
effects of the patent application process continue to bedevil antitrust courts long 
after patents have been granted, and indeed, even during their twilight.  Reverse 
settlement payments are a good example.
 the regulatory agency 
supervises not merely the creation of interests but also their ongoing behavior.  
Indeed, a common characteristic of regulated industries is ongoing supervision of 
a firm’s activities.  The patent system differs in this respect.  While we have a 
great deal of supervision over the patent creation process, once a patent is 
created government agencies have relatively little to say about how it is used. In 
the regulatory context this is important because the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that active regulatory oversight of private discretionary conduct is 
essential to antitrust immunity. 
 
71
                                                 
70 Verizon Communications  Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 
413 (2004);Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billings, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
71 See discussion supra, text at notes ___. 
  The courts defer to the regulatory 
problem of poor boundaries by approving blatantly anticompetitive market 
division agreements.  We would prefer that the courts strike a different balance 
by giving less deference to a badly designed patent policy and more to antitrust. 
 
 
